We propose a social choice rule for aggregating preferences elicited from surveys into a marginal adjustment of policy from the status quo. The mechanism is: (i) symmetric in its treatment of survey respondents; (ii) ordinal, using only the orientation of respondents' indifference surfaces; (iii) local, using only preferences in the neighborhood of current policy; and (iv) what we call "first-order strategy-proof," making the gains from misreporting preferences second order. The mechanism could be applied to guide policy based on how policy affects responses to subjective well-being surveys.
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Making policy choices is unavoidable. The standard economic approach to guiding policy consists of two steps: estimate policy effects on individuals' utility, and then use a social choice rule that aggregates across individuals to generate a policy recommendation. Traditionally, the policy-effect estimates come from market data. However, market data are insufficient in some contexts involving externalities, public goods, and non-market goods, and may not reliably reveal preferences in contexts where people are uninformed or make systematic mistakes. For these reasons, economists have increasingly been exploring survey-based approaches to estimating policy effects on utility. For our purposes, such surveys have two key features: they are unincentivized, and they generally work best for eliciting local preferences at the status quo (because respondents find it harder to introspect about how they would feel in counterfactual, unfamiliar situations). In this paper, we propose a social choice rule for aggregating local ordinal preferences elicited from surveys into a local policy improvement, while reducing the incentive for survey respondents to misreport their preferences.
We have in mind three examples of survey-based preference measurement to which our method could be applied. First, contingent valuation surveys often elicit respondents' marginal rates of substitution between different policies or between a policy and money (i.e., willingness to pay).
Second, much research on subjective well-being (SWB) treats the response to a SWB survey question, typically regarding happiness or life satisfaction, as a proxy for utility and estimates how policies affect it. Unlike contingent valuation or policy referendums, this approach sidesteps respondents' policy misconceptions or lack of information; and relative to traditional market-based indicators such as GDP, SWB data may capture a broader range of aspects of wellbeing (e.g., Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009 ). However, evidence indicates that people make choices that systematically deviate from what they believe would maximize their responses to commonly-used SWB measures Rees-Jones, 2012, 2013) , suggesting that a single-question SWB measure is inadequate as a utility proxy.
The primary application we have in mind is estimating the effects of policy on responses to a range of SWB questions that capture distinct aspects of well-being, including, for example, own and family happiness, health, security, and freedoms. The effect of policy on utility can be estimated as a weighted average of the effect of policy on these responses, with the weights derived from a separate survey that elicits individuals' marginal rates of substitution across 3 aspects of well-being. 1 The theory and methods for combining responses to multiple SWB questions into a utility proxy are developed in a companion paper (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot, 2012) .
I. Key Properties
As our setup, we imagine a government agency that conducts a national survey-along the lines of one of the above examples-and uses it to estimate local preferences over policies.
Our proposed mechanism for aggregating these preferences to yield a local policy change has four defining features.
First, the mechanism treats all individuals symmetrically. Second, it treats the preference data as ordinal and non-comparable across individuals. When aggregating policy effects on a SWB-based utility proxy, non-comparability is important not only because of well-known objections to assuming interpersonal comparability of utility, but also because different people might use the SWB response scales differently.
Third, the mechanism is local in using only the orientation of indifference surfaces in the neighborhood of a status-quo policy vector, and in generating a marginal adjustment of policy.
Two attractions of a local approach to social choice are that local policy effects can be estimated empirically more credibly than global effects, and that designing policy de novo is usually less practical than adjusting policy (cf. Feldstein, 1976) . Moreover, in the particular context of SWB data, we believe that using these data in a limited way (as a supplement to more familiar inputs to policy-making) is prudent because the enterprise is still exploratory and untested.
Finally, the mechanism is what we call "first-order strategy-proof" (FOSP). The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem rules out a mechanism being strategy-proof for all possible preferences; FOSP means strategy-proofness when indifference surfaces over policies are linear.
That is, in the mechanism-design problem where each such individual reports her local preferences to the government agency, the mechanism makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy. Hence if the agency estimates policy preferences from SWB data, answering the SWB 1 While such a combination of SWB measures may be the best available candidate for a survey-based utility proxy, we emphasize the need for work to deal with a variety of issues that bedevil the measurement of SWB (see, e.g., Adler, 2012) , which we do not address. In addition, there are many econometric challenges to identifying the effects of policy on SWB responses. For example, a policy might affect an individual's use of the response scale. survey honestly is a dominant strategy. More generally, since any smooth indifference surface is locally linear, FOSP makes the gains from misreporting second order.
While incentive-compatibility has been a concern in the contingent valuation literature, it is virtually unmentioned in the SWB literature. Indeed, there are reasons not to worry: any single individual would have negligible effect on policy but may incur a psychic cost from being dishonest, and many ways of advantageously manipulating responses would be hard to figure out because the survey responses only matter indirectly for policy (via the agency's estimates of policy effects).
Nonetheless, we would be worried if there were easy ways to advantageously manipulate policy, because interest groups could organize their members to do so. 2 FOSP rules out many straightforward incentives for survey-response manipulation.
II. The Aggregation Mechanism
Suppose that there are P ≥ 1 policies. Each element of represents the level of one policy and is a real number that the government can adjust independently of other policies. (It is straightforward to recast the policy vector to eliminate dependencies-e.g., those due to a budget constraint-by reducing the dimensionality of the policy space.) Let denote the status-quo policy vector. There are Θ > 1 types in the population, defined by having identical preferences over policies (a reduced-form representation of the effects of policies on the arguments of utility). For each type , let denote its fraction of the population. Let denote its ordinal utility as implied by its survey responses, which-allowing for misreportingis not necessarily the same as , its true ordinal utility. We assume that each and is continuously differentiable, and hence we can locally approximate them as linear.
A government agency conducts a national survey and, for each type , uses the survey responses to estimate the marginal rates of substitution, , across each pair of policies j and k. Let and respectively denote the gradients at of the (survey-based) utility-proxy and the (unobserved) utility. 3 The agency's aggregation mechanism is its algorithm for mapping the 's into a policy change .
Since the P policies are measured in different units (e.g., tax rate vs. dollars of spending), it is necessary to define what is meant by a "local change" in each policy. For each policy j, let the exogenous distance-metric parameter denote the amount of change corresponding to "1 policy-unit." Three considerations may inform how the 's are set. First, since the mechanism assumes that the indifference surfaces are linear, the policy units should be small enough that this approximation is likely to be good based on prior beliefs. Second, since 1 policy unit will be the maximum Euclidean distance that the mechanism can prescribe, should be small enough that policymakers are comfortable entrusting amount of policy j to be determined by survey data. Third, the relative 's can correspond to intuitive judgments of similar-sized changes. The mechanism's key properties do not depend on the values of the 's but, as we discuss in section IV below, these values would matter in practice. . 3 We assume local non-satiation except at a bliss point. Then, without loss of generality, we choose a monotonic transformation for and such that neither nor is an inflection point. This ensures that if and only if is a bliss point of , and if and only if is a bliss point of .
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In order to apply the mechanism, the agency must pin down the policy units. . Figure 1 , each is a vector of length 1 that points in the direction of maximal increase in the utility proxy for the group.
As illustrated in
The aggregation mechanism is: Θ In words, the policy change (in policy units) is the weighted sum of the normalized gradients, with weights equal to population shares. To see that the mechanism is FOSP, notice that it decentralizes the policy change: each type contributes a vector (of fixed length) that it chooses via its survey responses. Each type evaluates its most-preferred direction starting at (i.e., taking into account the summed contributions of the other types), but with linear preferences, the most-preferred direction there is the same as at . Therefore, each type does best by ensuring that the agency's estimate of its most-preferred direction at is correct-i.e., that is proportional to .
Example (continued):
To provide some intuition regarding the form of the mechanism, consider the problem faced by a social planner who directly observed the cardinal utilities of the individuals and maximized a social welfare function, Θ , where is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable. To ensure that the policy change is local, we constrain it to be at most 1 policy unit: Θ subject to
The vector first-order condition is Θ , where is the Lagrange multiplier. Hence the optimal has length 1 policy unit and direction Θ . Notice that our mechanism is this solution, except: (i) is replaced by (because respondents are treated symmetrically); (ii) is replaced by (because only a survey-based gradient is available, and it must be normalized since its magnitude has no meaning); and (iii) our mechanism changes policy by less than 1 policy unit unless all types have the same local preferences.
This set of observations yields three insights. First, a (non-symmetric) variant of the mechanism could give different weights to different types (e.g., more weight to worse-off individuals). Second, given that every type has an incentive to ensure that its is proportional to its , the direction of change yielded by the mechanism is optimal for the class of social welfare functions satisfying for each . Therefore, if the agency had only ordinal preference data but were not concerned about incentive-compatibility, it might nonetheless use the mechanism to determine the direction of policy change-but then implement a change of 1 policy unit. Finally, the inefficiency that arises from changing policy by less than 1 policy unit can be interpreted as the social cost incurred by having FOSP. As illustrated in Figure 3 , if the policy change were instead guaranteed to have length 1 policy unit, then in general there would be an incentive to misreport one's preferences. 4
III. Additional Properties
The mechanism satisfies a local version of the Paretian principle: if some direction of policy change would make all groups better off, then the mechanism will implement change in that direction. Formally, for any policy-change vector such that for all , it follows that Θ and hence . This property implies that, even if respondents have divergent interests on some policy dimensions, the mechanism will find and implement changes on policy dimensions where respondents' interests coincide. The mechanism can even disfavor policies, such as certain restrictions on trade, that benefit a few individuals a great deal but hurt almost everyone else a little bit.
Another important property is that, when P > 1, each type has more influence on the policy change along the policy dimensions where a marginal adjustment matters relatively more to that type. Consequently, the direction prescribed by the mechanism can depend on which and how many dimensions are included. Figure 4 illustrates an example with three types that have equal population weights. With only information about preferences over policy dimension 1 (Figure 4b ), the mechanism, which specializes to sign Θ , prescribes an increase in policy 1. Incorporating information about preferences over dimension 2 (Figure 4a ), however, the mechanism prescribes a decrease in policy 1. Since including more dimensions uses more information on tradeoffs, the mechanism ideally would be used with as many policy dimensions included as possible.
IV. Discussion
The mechanism's biggest practical limitation may be the degrees of freedom afforded by the several considerations that inform the choice of the 's. All else equal, with a larger the mechanism will generate a policy change that is relatively larger in magnitude in dimension j; it could also reverse the direction of change in another dimension (in Figure 4 , changing from zero to positive reverses dimension 1's direction of change). To minimize the risk of manipulation by government (which is akin to agenda-setting), it is crucial that the agency that determines the 's be independent and non-political.
Since in practice the mechanism would be likely to be applied iteratively, the most urgent next step is to understand its dynamic properties. Our preliminary analysis suggests that if individuals differ in their preferences but truthfully report them, the iterated mechanism could in some circumstances have a limit cycle. We view such non-convergence as an undesirable property similar in spirit to the intransitivity of voting-a limitation that the public seems willing to tolerate in democracies. Moreover, any social-preference ordering that uses only local information about individuals' preferences will be intransitive (Fleurbaey, Suzumura, and Tadenuma, 2005) ; indeed, it is well-known that widely-used criteria such as compensating variation share this limitation.
We view this paper primarily as a first step that merits further development. Nonetheless, there are several immediately actionable implications for empirical researchers that would facilitate exploring realistic applications of the mechanism. First, researchers should report the quantile of SWB respondents at which the estimated effect of a policy is zero; the mechanism as applied only to that policy dimension would dictate adjustment proportional to the implied vote margin. Second, when studying the effect of more than one policy, researchers should report the marginal rate of substitution between policies. Third, researchers should report policy effects on different subgroups of the population in order to move toward identifying types and analyzing the implied tradeoffs between them. 
